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What makes workers happy: 
Empowerment, unions or  
both?
Peter H van der Meer
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Abstract
Does the negative effect of union membership on job satisfaction, as shown in Anglophone 
countries, also hold for Continental Western Europe? Given the differences in industrial 
relations, I hypothesize that the effect will be different. I also test hypotheses about the effect of 
empowerment on job satisfaction, which might explain the negative union effect, and broaden the 
analysis to include pay satisfaction. Analyses of European Social Survey data show that the negative 
union effect does not exist for Continental Western Europe and that this can be explained by 
empowerment of employees.
Keywords
Empowerment, job satisfaction, pay, personnel economics, trade unions, Western Europe
Introduction
Over a long period, research has shown that unions improve wages and working condi-
tions, but somewhat paradoxically that unionized workers are less satisfied than average 
with their job. This result has been reproduced in many studies (such as Bender and 
Sloane, 1998; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Gordon and Denisi, 1995; Guest and Conway, 
2004; Miller, 1990; Renaud, 2002), mainly conducted in the USA and other Anglophone 
countries. Laroche (2016) shows in a meta-analysis that these results are robust. However, 
their explanations are not.
In the literature, two explanations prevail. The first is based on the ‘voice’ thesis, which 
states that union members voice their discontent, whereas non-members leave the firm. 
Furthermore, unions raise discontent to increase their bargaining power (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984; Gordon and Denisi, 1995). The second derives from the thesis that workers 
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in bad jobs and, relatedly, dissatisfied workers are more likely to unionize. This is also 
known as reverse causality (Bender and Sloane, 1998; Bryson et al., 2010; Hammer and 
Avgar, 2005; Schwochau, 1987). Because empirical evidence of these explanations is 
mixed, I put forward an additional explanation based on empowerment. Freeman and 
Rogers (2006) show for the USA that workers like to be empowered, but mostly are not.
Empowered employees have a say, sometimes small sometimes large, in how an 
organization is managed. By empowerment I mean that employees gain decision rights, 
or influence, over how the organization is managed, which goes beyond autonomy in 
their own job. Empowered workers not only have a say in how their own job is per-
formed best (autonomy) but also in how the organization is or could be run, how their 
colleagues could do their jobs and how teams are organized and tasks are allocated 
among colleagues and team members. It goes from irregular informal work meetings, via 
official works councils to employee representatives on the board of the organization. 
Empowerment covers both unionized and non-unionized workers and firms. However, 
empowerment is connected to unionization: Freeman and Lazear (2006) and Lazear and 
Gibbs (2009) present an economic model of empowerment and connect this directly to 
unionization of firms. But employees in non-unionized firms can be empowered too. The 
elaboration towards empowerment is based on the fact that workers with high levels of 
autonomy, one form of empowerment, are happier (Van der Meer and Wielers, 2013). 
This robust result links empowerment to job satisfaction and would suggest that union 
members are more satisfied than non-members, because they have higher levels of 
empowerment (Guest and Conway, 2004).
I test this idea not only on Anglophone data but on other Continental Western 
European (CWE) countries too, to add different industrial relations systems into the 
research about the effect of union membership on job satisfaction. Such research out-
side Anglophone countries is rare, with a few notable exceptions such as Donegani and 
McKay (2012), García-Serrano (2009), Hipp and Givan (2015) and Laroche (2017). 
The effect of union membership on job satisfaction could be different in CWE coun-
tries, given the differences in industrial relations institutions and practices. This idea is 
linked to the effect of the industrial relations climate on job satisfaction (Hipp and 
Givan, 2015).
Research into the combined effect of unions and empowerment on job satisfaction is 
rare. I could only find two studies (Holland et al., 2011; Wood, 2008) that report on these 
effects, but these two studies treat unions and empowerment as separate features. They 
do not hypothesize any linkages between these concepts.
To test the effects of empowerment and union membership, I also look into pay satis-
faction. This concerns only the pecuniary reward of a job, not the non-pecuniary rewards, 
so is therefore a somewhat more limited concept than job satisfaction.
I use the fifth round of the European Social Survey (ESS) held in 2010 to test my 
hypotheses. I use data from 13 different European countries, covering CWE and Ireland 
and the UK. The data set is a representative random sample from these populations and 
contains information about union membership, work, different forms of empowerment 
and job and pay satisfaction. The ESS is the only survey that I could find, which contains 
information on both union membership and various forms of empowerment for different 
countries.
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In the next section, I summarize the main literature about union membership and job 
satisfaction and elaborate on the effects of empowerment. Next I explain the differences 
between the countries. This results in several hypotheses which will be tested. I then 
address the data and methods, before presenting the results of the analyses. In the final 
section, I summarize the research and draw some conclusions, including policy 
recommendations.
Unions, job satisfaction and empowerment
Freeman and Medoff (1984) wrote that in the USA, unions improve workers’ working 
conditions and wages, but that unionized workers were less satisfied than non-unionized 
with their job. At least since these results have been published, this has become a theo-
retical puzzle. A prominent explanation in the literature is the ‘exit-voice’ thesis, which 
reads that dissatisfied non-members leave the organization, whereas dissatisfied mem-
bers raise their voice (Bryson et al., 2004, 2010). Implicit in this thesis is that raising 
voice does not diminish complaints; these are at best partially resolved, otherwise the 
dissatisfaction would disappear. It further raises the question why these dissatisfied 
union members do not look for another job.
This is addressed by a second explanation, which focuses on specific individual char-
acteristics and states that the dissatisfied union members are sorted into jobs with bad 
working conditions. It is primarily these workers who are dissatisfied who become 
unionized, and additionally complainers who join unions. Thus, some kind of sorting 
mechanism explains the differences in job satisfaction between union members and non-
members (Bender and Sloane, 1998; Hammer and Avgar, 2005; Laroche, 2017).
Holland et al. (2011) show that the possibility of voice explains the negative effect of 
union membership in Australia. They studied the effect of direct voice (one form of 
empowerment) and union voice on job satisfaction, because an important role of unions 
is to represent workers and express their voice in their relations with employers. Now 
that union membership is declining and more and more employers give direct voice to 
workers instead of unions, they wanted to know how this relates to job satisfaction. In 
their research, they find a positive effect of direct voice and autonomy on job satisfac-
tion, but they do not find any effect of union voice and union membership.
In these studies, voice is measured or defined as the extent to which managers at the 
workplace consult employees or their representatives and whether a union is present at the 
workplace. I follow this definition. The first part refers to what I call empowerment, in 
which employees have direct contact with their colleagues, supervisors and higher man-
agers to improve work and/or working conditions. The second part refers to indirect or 
collective voice in which union representatives either through presence at the workplace 
or through central collective negotiations try to improve work and working conditions.
Empowerment or direct voice is studied more often in Human Resource Management, 
whereas indirect or collective voice is studied more often in Employment or Industrial 
Relations (Mowbray et al., 2015). I use both concepts, because empowerment and col-
lective voice are complements, as Holland et al. (2011) show. I further use measures of 
autonomy, because these are linked to empowerment (Carr and Mellizo, 2013; Mowbray 
et al., 2015).
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Holland et al. (2012) examined the relationship between employee voice arrange-
ments and employees’ trust in management. They found a positive relation between trust 
in management and empowerment but a negative relation with union voice. This might 
explain why a negative relation is found between job satisfaction and union membership 
and a positive relation with empowerment. In unionized firms, there is a lack of trust 
between employees and management, which has a large negative effect on job satisfac-
tion (Helliwell and Huang, 2011). They further show that union members find trust less 
important than non-unionists but also that trust is lower, on average, in unionized firms 
than in non-unionized. Managerial opposition to unions lowers trust in management 
(Bryson, 2001), and thereby job satisfaction, explaining the effect of union membership 
on job satisfaction in the Anglophone context. So the level of empowerment and the way 
employees are empowered might explain the negative effect of union membership on job 
satisfaction in these countries. Empowerment without union involvement increases job 
satisfaction, whereas empowerment through unions decreases job satisfaction, because 
of poor relations between employees and management.
Employers do not trust unions, and an increasing number in Anglophone countries 
oppose unions. They make it more difficult for workers to unionize and many try to drive 
out unions. The main reason is to increase shareholder value and reduce the labour share 
in added value (Freeman and Lazear, 2006; Lazear and Gibbs, 2009). Given such distrust 
between management and employees, union members in unionized firms are less satis-
fied. If employers find a way to empower employees without involving unions, these 
employees will be more satisfied.
So my first hypothesis is that unions have a negative effect on job satisfaction. My 
second is that empowerment has a positive effect. My third is that the association between 
empowerment and non-union firms can explain the negative union effect. I also expect, 
fourth, that the effect of direct voice, one form of empowerment, on job satisfaction will 
be higher than that of collective voice, because of the role trust plays in the employment 
relation.
To test these hypotheses fully, I would need data about job satisfaction, union mem-
bership, empowerment and trust. Unfortunately, I was unable to find a data set that con-
tains all this information. So, I have to find a way around. One way of doing this is by 
looking at differences between countries, especially between those with different sys-
tems of industrial relations. A main characteristic of the Anglophone system is the activ-
ity of unions within firms (Bamber et al., 2016). Firms are unionized or not: in some, 
unions and union members play an active role in negotiations between employees and 
management about wages and working conditions, and these negotiations are the cause 
of mistrust between management and unions. The unions do not play such a role in non-
unionized firms. In these firms, individual workers or non-union representatives negoti-
ate, through direct voice. Given the absence of the unions at the firm level in these firms, 
the level of trust between management and employees is higher.
In CWE, industrial relations are organized differently. Unions play less of a role at the 
firm level, and it is therefore not possible to distinguish between unionized and non-
unionized firms, only between those covered or not covered by collective agreements. 
There are often big differences between union density and bargaining coverage (Visser, 
2010). So improvements achieved by unions are not restricted to union members, 
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whereas empowerment is restricted to the employees directly involved. When unions 
negotiate about wages and working conditions, they do so mostly at the industry, regional 
or even national level (Bamber et al., 2016). Although there might be distrust between 
unions and employers, this distrust is not felt directly in the workplace, because negotia-
tions take place at a higher level. The amount of trust between employees and manage-
ment is less affected by what the unions do, because they are less present on a day-to-day 
basis in the firms themselves. I therefore hypothesize, fifth, that the effect of union mem-
bership on job satisfaction will be less negative in CWE than in Anglophone countries. 
The effect could even be positive, because of the improvements in working conditions 
and wages.
Empowerment will have the same positive effect on the relations between employees 
and management in CWE as in the Anglophone countries. The reason is the same. 
Empowerment improves trust between employees and management, and thereby 
increases job satisfaction. For CWE, I expect to find the same positive effect of empow-
erment on job satisfaction as for the Anglophone countries.
Because negotiated wage increases are much more restricted to union members in the 
Anglophone countries than in CWE, I hypothesize, sixth, that the effect of union mem-
bership on pay satisfaction will be stronger in the Anglophone countries than in CWE.
Data and method
Data
I test my hypotheses on the basis of ESS round 5, held in 2010. I use data from 13 dif-
ferent European countries, comprising two subpopulations: CWE (Belgium, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal and Sweden) as coordinated market economies, and Anglophone countries 
(UK and Ireland) as liberal market economies. The data set is a representative sample 
from the population and contains information about union membership, work, empow-
erment, direct voice, collective voice and job and pay satisfaction. The ESS has already 
been used by Donegani and McKay (2012) to test the effect of union membership on 
job satisfaction. They used waves 3 and 5 and more countries. However, they did not 
test for the effects of empowerment. The ESS, round 5, contains a model on work–life 
balance and has therefore more information about job characteristics than the other 
rounds of this survey.
My subsample consists of persons in paid employment and between 25 and 60 years 
of age. Those younger could still be in full-time education and those older could already 
be retired. Those in the sample have a job and can become a union member. I further 
restrict the sample to those who answered the questions of interest. For the control vari-
ables, I applied a strategy of mean substitution. Although the number of missing answers 
per variable is not high, I would lose too many respondents, given the number of control 
variables.
Job satisfaction is measured by the question ‘How satisfied are you in your main job?’ 
with a range from 0 to 10. As a second dependent variable I use pay satisfaction, meas-
ured on a five-point scale by a single question.
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Trade union membership is captured by a question about current and past union mem-
bership. I created one dummy variable indicating current union membership.
I measure empowerment in three different ways: autonomy, direct voice and influ-
ence. To measure autonomy, I combine three questions into one measure: being allowed 
to decide how to organize one’s daily work, the influence to choose or change the pace 
of work and the ability to decide the time to start and finish work. I rescaled all answers 
on a scale from 0 to 10 to make them comparable. The reliability of this scale of auton-
omy is 0.74.
I measure direct voice by a question about how much influence discussions have on 
decisions that affect working conditions, on a scale from 0 to 4. I measure influence by a 
question on the possibility to influence policy decisions about activities of organization, 
on a scale from 0 to 10. I construct a measure of collective voice on the basis of a ques-
tion about the influence of trade unions on working conditions and practices on a scale 
from 1 to 4. This could be through trade union representatives in works councils or 
through central collective agreements. I cannot distinguish between these two. Because 
a union is not present in all the firms, I created a dummy variable indicating the absence 
of a union and replaced the missing values on collective voice by the country group mean 
and centred this variable around its group mean. In this way, I capture the true effect of 
collective voice.
To take account of sorting effects, I control for both personal and job characteristics 
that could influence union membership. As personal characteristics, I include age (and its 
square), gender, having a partner, having children living at home, educational level, sub-
jective health (reverse coded), subjective income (reverse coded), working experience, 
tenure in the occupation and tenure at the firm.
For job characteristics, I use information about being a supervisor, the employment 
contract (temporary or open-ended), contractual working hours and irregular working 
hours (a combination of working evenings or nights, overtime on short notice and at 
weekends), on a scale from 1 to 5 (reliability = 0.67). I measure the length of job-specific 
training and whether the respondent has attended a work-related course, lecture or con-
ference. I further include an indicator variable of establishment size, consisting of five 
categories. Further measures of job characteristics include variety in work, learning new 
things and support from co-workers and job security, all measured on a scale from 1 to 
4. I include two measures of work pressure, ‘my job requires that I work very hard’ and 
‘I do not have enough time to get everything done’, on a scale from 1 to 5. I also have a 
measure of opportunities for advancement on a scale from 1 to 5. As additional controls 
in the treatment effects analyses, I use the first digit of the statistical classification of 
economic activities in the European Community (NACE), as union membership and job 
characteristics differ between industries.
Descriptive information on most variables and the correlations between my variables 
of interest for both subpopulations is presented in the Online Annex.
Method
I start with a regression model using job satisfaction and pay satisfaction as dependent 
variables. To control for country differences, I use robust regression where the standard 
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errors are clustered at the country level and include country fixed effects. I estimate (ver-
sions of) the following equation
 H = + U + A + DV + I + CV + C +i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i iβ β β β β β β ε  (1)
where Hi is job satisfaction or pay satisfaction of a person i. U indicates union member-
ship; A, autonomy; DV, direct voice; I, influence; CV, collective voice; and C, the control 
variables consisting of the personal and job characteristics and country fixed effects. I 
use a linear model instead of an ordered model, because these models hardly show any 
differences in results when the dependent variable has an 11-point scale like job satisfac-
tion (Van der Meer and Wielers, 2013).
The ‘exit-voice’ hypothesis suggests that union membership is an endogenous varia-
ble and is dependent on the type of job and type of worker. To take account of the endo-
geneity of union membership, I estimate an endogenous treatment effects model. The 
general model is
 H = + U + A + DV + E + CV + C + IMR +i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i iβ β β β β β β β ε  (2)
 Probit U = + A + DV + E + CV + C + Ind+ wi 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i( ) α α α α α α α  (3)
In this system, the error terms εi and wi are correlated. I estimate the model with the 
probit of joining a union (equation (3)) and use this result to calculate the Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR). The IMR is included in equation (2). Applying maximum likelihood meth-
ods produces consistent estimates of the parameters. To fit the model, it is necessary to 
include instrumental variables for joining a union. I use industry dummies (Ind) as instru-
ments because other research (Bryson et al., 2004) shows these to be good instruments. 
Union membership varies over industries and previous research has shown that these can 
help to predict union membership. In Stata, a module is implemented to estimate such a 
model. I use the survey data module (svy) to weight properly the data as the ESS organi-
zation suggests. This module also calculates robust standard errors.
Results
Table 1 contains the results on job satisfaction for the UK and Ireland and for CWE. In 
the basic model, which contains only the effect of union membership on job satisfaction, 
I find no effect on job satisfaction in the UK and Ireland. In model 2, I find that the effect 
of union membership is positive but also that the effect of union presence is negative. 
Their combined effect is negative (–0.142 (0.030) t = –4.78) and significant, corroborat-
ing earlier research on the effect of unions on job satisfaction in Anglophone countries 
and supporting my first hypothesis. This result supports the idea regarding trust between 
workers and management, which is violated once the union is present in a firm or organi-
zation. The effect stays negative after controlling for personal characteristics. In the full 
model, controlling for both person and job characteristics, the effect of union member-
ship is small and insignificant and the effect of union presence is positive but also small. 
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This result suggests that some kind of sorting mechanism contributes to the explanation 
of the negative union effect.
Furthermore, I find effects of empowerment on job satisfaction: both direct voice and 
influence have positive and sizeable effects. I also find a positive effect of collective 
voice on job satisfaction. This supports my second hypothesis. Given the insignificant 
union effect, I did not find support for hypothesis 3 about the mediating effect of empow-
erment. The effect of direct voice is stronger than that of collective voice, supporting 
hypothesis 4.
For the UK and Ireland, I find a positive raw effect of union membership on pay sat-
isfaction. This supports hypothesis 6 and corroborates the results of research that shows 
that union members earn higher wages than non-union members. This raw effect is 
explained away in the full model. The indicators for empowerment and collective voice 
reduce the effect by approximately 50 percent. The effect becomes even negative after 
controlling for personal characteristics but disappears in the full model in which I also 
control for job characteristics. In the full model, I find a strong positive effect of union 
Table 1. Results of robust regression of job satisfaction.
Model UK and Ireland Continental Western Europe



















0.050 0.073* −0.020* 0.005 0.031 −0.051 −0.086 −0.067
(0.040) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.110) (0.096) (0.105) (0.095)
Autonomy 0.128* 0.138* 0.098* 0.142* 0.134* 0.092*
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008)
Direct voice 0.332* 0.323* 0.155* 0.155* 0.137* 0.089*
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017)
Influence 0.070* 0.061* 0.035* 0.045* 0.047* 0.021*
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Union presence −0.215* −0.139* 0.039* −0.074* −0.063 −0.086
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.003) (0.035) (0.031) (0.066)
Collective voice 0.119* 0.108* 0.136* 0.123 0.122* 0.091
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.061) (0.051) (0.047)
Person 
characteristics
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Job characteristics No No No Yes No No No Yes
Constant 7.119* 5.559* 2.389* 1.732* 7.720* 6.606* 5.004* 4.411*
(0.011) (0.017) (0.168) (0.024) (0.058) (0.091) (0.476) (0.534)
N 17,746 17,746 17,746 17,746 17,746 17,746 17,746 17,746
R2 0.001 0.122 0.18 0.339 0.012 0.086 0.128 0.212
s.e.: standard error.
*p<0.05.
Source: ESS5 (European Social Survey, round 5), own calculations.
All models include country fixed effects.
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presence. The combined effect of union membership and union presence is significant 
(0.221 (0.021) t = –10.14). I also find a positive effect of collective voice. All other indi-
cators of empowerment and collective voice also have a positive effect on pay satisfac-
tion. All results for pay satisfaction are presented in the Online Annex.
Table 1 also presents the results for CWE. Union membership has no effect on job 
satisfaction in any of the models. Contrary to the UK, I do not find effects of union pres-
ence on job satisfaction. This supports hypothesis 5 about the differences between the 
UK and Ireland as against CWE. Furthermore, I find strong effects of autonomy, direct 
voice and influence, and in the case of CWE, empowerment does mediate to a small 
extent the union effect, supporting hypotheses 2 and 3. In the case of CWE, I do not find 
a difference in effect between direct and collective voice.
There is no raw effect of union membership on pay satisfaction. The effect becomes 
negative in the full model. This supports hypothesis 6, which states that this effect will 
be smaller in CWE than in the UK and Ireland. There is a positive effect of autonomy and 
a strong positive effect of collective voice on pay satisfaction.
Because the sorting explanation of the negative union effect on job satisfaction finds 
some support in these analyses, I also estimated a treatment effects model, to model 
explicitly the sorting mechanism. These results are shown in Table 2, which shows that 
union membership has a strong positive effect on job satisfaction. This effect is much 
stronger than the effect of union presence, so unions do increase job satisfaction for the 
UK and Ireland. I also find positive effects of autonomy, direct voice and influence. So 
empowerment increases job satisfaction; it also mediates the union membership effect, 
although not completely. For the UK and Ireland, I find an insignificant effect of union 
membership on pay satisfaction and a positive effect of union presence, making the com-
bined effect positive as well. I also find positive effects of autonomy, direct voice and 
influence, but these effects are much smaller. This is the same as in the regression model. 
Again the effect of direct voice is larger than that of collective voice.
Table 2 shows a strong positive effect of union membership on job satisfaction for 
CWE. This is different from the regression analyses, so unions do improve job satisfac-
tion in CWE. I also find effects of autonomy, direct voice and influence on job satisfac-
tion. These effects of empowerment hardly mediate the effect of union membership. I do 
not find an effect of union membership on pay satisfaction. The only significant effect is 
that of autonomy.
Summary and conclusion
In this research, I tested an additional explanation for the negative union effect on job 
satisfaction. In the literature, two explanations stand out. The first is based on the exit-
voice hypotheses as put forward by Freeman and Medoff (1984) and the second on sort-
ing effects (Bender and Sloane, 1998). Because support for these explanations is mixed, 
I put forward an additional explanation based on empowerment: this may have a positive 
effect on job satisfaction because it improves the employment relationship. Empowered 
workers have a trust relation with management, which improves job satisfaction. 
However, in unionized firms, this trust relation is absent. Management does not trust 
unions and many firms try to prevent from becoming unionized. So I test whether 
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empowerment has a positive effect on job satisfaction and if this can explain the union 
effect. I do so first for the Anglophone countries, because most research into the union 
effect stems from these countries. Second, I also test this hypothesis for 11 CWE coun-
tries, for two reasons: first to estimate the union effect for these countries, because 
research into the union effect outside Anglophone countries is still rare; and second 
because it provides a further test of the relation between empowerment, the union effect 
and job satisfaction. This is important because there is an essential difference in indus-
trial relations systems between the Anglophone countries and CWE, which is the pres-
ence of the union within firms, where unions are active in individual firms (the unionized 
ones) in Anglophone countries and unions are less active in the other CWE countries. 
Here, negotiations between unions and employers take place at the industrial, regional or 
national level and much less at the firm level. In these countries, the distrust between 
union and employers is much less felt on the work-floor.
My first hypothesis is a replication of the negative union effect for the Anglophone 
countries. Although I did not find a direct negative effect of union membership on job 
Table 2. Results of endogenous treatment effects model of job satisfaction.
UK and Ireland Continental Western 
Europe









Union membership 1.000* 0.695* 0.885* 0.765*
(0.033) (0.044) (0.180) (0.212)
Autonomy 0.116* 0.099*
 (0.010) (0.009)




Union presence 0.018* −0.090
 (0.001) (0.065)
Collective voice 0.023* 0.024
 (0.011) (0.060)
Personal characteristics No Yes No Yes
Job characteristics No Yes No Yes
Constant 6.867* 2.008* 7.269* 4.308*
(0.009) (0.018) (0.095) (0.636)
N 17,746 17,746 17,746 17,746
df_m 1 1 1 10
s.e.: standard error.
*p<0.05.
Source: ESS5 (European Social Survey, round 5), own calculations.
All models include country fixed effects.
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satisfaction, I did find a negative effect of union presence. So unions do have a negative 
effect on job satisfaction.
My second hypothesis reads that empowerment has a positive effect on job satisfac-
tion. I did find support for this hypothesis in the Anglophone countries: all my indicators 
of empowerment showed strong positive effects on job satisfaction. However, for these 
countries, I did not find a mediating effect of empowerment on the negative union effect, 
my third hypothesis. Thus, I cannot say that empowerment explains the union effect in 
the UK and Ireland.
My fourth hypothesis about the difference in effect on job satisfaction between direct 
and collective voice is also supported. As expected, I find a larger effect of direct than of 
collective voice.
Given the differences in industrial relations, I expected to find a less negative effect 
of unions on job satisfaction in CWE, hypothesis 5. The results of the analyses support 
this hypothesis, because I did not find significant effects of union membership or union 
presence on job satisfaction.
Hypothesis 6 concerning the difference in union effect on pay satisfaction between 
the UK and Ireland and CWE finds support in the analysis. As expected, the effect for the 
UK and Ireland is larger than for CWE, because of the more decentralized negotiations.
All in all, I can say that most hypotheses were supported by the empirical results and 
that the negative union effect found in Anglophone countries does not hold for CWE. 
This can be explained by the differences in industrial relations. In the Anglophone coun-
tries, unions are organized within firms and are much more present there. In these coun-
tries, firms are unionized or non-unionized, meaning that, where present, unions can 
negotiate with management about working conditions and pay, representing the union 
members. In CWE, negotiations between unions and employers take place mainly out-
side the firm; so unions are much less present and visible within firms than in the 
Anglophone countries. In CWE, employee representation takes place in regular work 
meetings, works councils and sometimes even in the board of the organization, as in 
Germany. Employees are not necessarily represented by union members but can be rep-
resented by non-unionists too. Therefore, workers are more satisfied by empowerment 
than by collective voice, as shown in this research.
That is also the reason why empowerment explains the smaller union effect in CWE 
but does so less in the UK and Ireland. Furthermore, I see that in the Anglophone coun-
tries, union members are more satisfied with their pay, whereas I do not find such an 
effect in CWE. Within Anglophone countries, the union members are directly repre-
sented in wage negotiations which take place within the firm, whereas in CWE these 
negotiations take place at a higher level where unions negotiate the wages of all the 
workers, not necessarily union members.
The differences in industrial relations also explain the relations between workers and 
managers within firms. In the UK and Ireland, unions and their members are mistrusted. 
Many managers oppose, sometimes actively, the unionization of their firm. If a firm is 
unionized, despite opposition, relations are often poor. This affects job satisfaction and 
subjective well-being. Trust at the workplace, between colleagues and managers, is a 
very strong contributor to job satisfaction. Although I do not have a direct measure of 
workplace trust, I see in my results that supervisors in the UK and Ireland have lower 
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than average job satisfaction, whereas in CWE they have at least the same level of satis-
faction. My interpretation is that in the UK and Ireland, the supervisors are caught 
between the workers whom they supervise and higher management who do not trust the 
ordinary worker. In CWE, with the tradition of direct representation, supervisors feel less 
trapped between workers and higher management. This supports the idea that trust at the 
workplace is important and suggests that this is different between the Anglophone coun-
tries and CWE.
My research does not reject the sorting and ‘exit-voice’ hypotheses that have been 
formulated to explain negative effects of unions in Anglophone countries. I find support 
for these hypotheses, but they do not tell the complete story, and do not explain the dif-
ferences between the UK and Ireland and CWE. Next to the sorting that is going on, we 
need to take account of the importance of empowerment. Empowerment, combined with 
trust, explains the differences between CWE and the Anglophone countries.
A shortcoming of this research is that I do not have a direct measure of trust at the 
workplace. I was unable to find a data set which includes the variables used here, job 
satisfaction, union membership, empowerment, collective voice and further job and per-
sonal characteristics, and also has a measure of trust at the workplace for both Anglophone 
countries and CWE. Maybe data from individual countries might be available to test the 
importance of workplace trust in CWE countries, as done by Helliwell and Huang (2011). 
This might shed more light on my proposed explanation of the negative union effect.
So this research suggests that managers should empower workers by giving them 
direct voice and possibilities to influence company policies and maybe even encouraging 
them to join a union. This empowerment not only increases job satisfaction but also 
increases productivity. Specific information is better used and this will increase produc-
tivity. In doing so, management should also increase autonomy and use more modern 
methods of job design.
However, nowadays in many European countries, union density is declining and 
union power as well. It has become more difficult for unions to organize workers; they 
do not see the benefits of the union or they free ride. In many instances, the negotiated 
pay and working conditions between unions and employers apply for both members and 
non-members. Moreover, some workers are still afraid to unionize, fearing that they 
might lose their job.
Workers in newer industries are less likely to unionize. Most unionized workers can 
be found in the public sector and in ‘old’ declining industries, so at national level unions 
are confronted with declining membership rates. Given the results of this research, this 
trend is bad for society at large. Governments could maybe help unions to increase mem-
bership density.
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